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FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1976
STATEHENT
OF
THE 1l0NORi\BLE ED\.JARD ll. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
TilE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOHMITTEE ON IMMIGRi\TION, CITIZENSHIP, AND INTEIWATIONAL LA",:

ON

GRi\ND JURY REFORM

10:00 A.M.
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1976
RA YBUlZN HOUSE OFFICE BU ILDING
WASllIi~GTOI~, D. C,

GIG
Mr. Chairman and Members of the"SlJt5corrunittee
I am pleased to respond to your invitation to address
this subcolmnittee in connection with its consideration of Jour
bills, II.J. Res 46 and 1I.R. 1277, and other proposals to alter
federal law with respect to

g~and

juries.

-.

'fhe grand jury has long been an important institution in
the criminal justicc sy[;lclll.
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Recent proposals concerning the grand j Ul'y ita ve rangcJ

trulil

its

abolition (following the British example) or its modification
in ways that would fundamentally alter its character to reforms
that would serve to protect grand jury witnesses while not
altering the core of the grand jury process.
The goals to be served by suggested reforms are diverse
and in some respects inconsistent.

There is the proper desire

that investigations, particularly where there is a nearness to
first amendment rights, be limited in such a way as t.o protect
fundamental political and civil liberties.

On the other hand

there is concern about the growing crime rate and the
problem of developing mechanisms and investigative techniques
in the criminal justice system to cope with it and ultimately,
it is hoped, bring the increase to a halt.

Finally,

in this era which goes by the name post-Watergate, there is a
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particular concern with white collar crime and official
corruption, matters in which the grand jury 'set"ves an extraordinarily important function.
These diverse concerns are reflected in the diverse
nature of suggested grand jury reform.

On the one hand, there

are proposals that would impose upon grand jury proceedings
safeguards of'individual rights to remain silent and to be
represented by counsel now required at trial or during
~terrogations

by police.

On the other hand, there are

proposals to unfetter the grand jury and to increase its power
as an investigatory unit.

It has been suggested, for example,

that special prosecutors independent of the executive branch
be made available to grand juries and supervising judges
and tha t such prosecutors be empowered to command the ass is tance
of investigative agencies.
A review of how the grand jury squares with our constitutiorral principles is unquestionably desirable.

Since federal

courts have not relinquished their jurisdiction over grand
juries, we must recognize that the issues that are of concern
to this conunittee have also been of continuing and recent concern
to the United States Suprell1e Court, which has spoken to many
of them and Vlhich has emphasized the supervisory func.tiol1 of
the court s .

This,. of cours e, does no t exCUse the Cong res sand

the executive branch of their responsibility to ~onsidcr the
issues, but the analysis of the Supreme Court can be of
considerable help in the task.

- 3 -
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The recent concern about the ~rand j ury ~":lwith its
diversity of perspectives and goals, develops' out of a
double function assumed by that institution during its
development in Anglo-American legal history.
llistorians are generally agreed that the grand tury
began as an investigatory tool for the crown.

By the mid-

fourteenth century the accusing jury, known as "Ie grande
inques t," cons is ted of twen ty- three members dra\Vl1 from the
county at large.

The grand jury system was originally

based on the expectation that its members would have
personal knowledge of the crimes
which they lived.

co~nitted

in the areas in

Societal changes made exclusive reliance

upon the jurors' personal knowledge increasingly unfeasible,
so grand jurors gradually began investigating charges
laid before them by others, and this required the taking
• and weighing of testimony.
The protective role of the grand jury was in some \<lays
a natural outgrowth of vesting the accusatorial and investigative functions of the criminal justice system in a body of
ordinary citizens.

As early as the fourteenth century,

legislation provided that no man could be held to anS\<ler for
treason or any a t.lle r capi tal crime excep t upon accus a tion of
the grand jury.

It was not until some three hundred years later,

however, during the growth of regal pO\<ler under the Stuarts,
that the grand jury became highly prized as a safeguard

-

against arbitrary

L~

pros~cution.

-

C13
In two widely:acclaimed
.1~r

cases in 1681--one involving the Earl 6f Shaftsbury and the
other Stephen Cooledge--grand juries refused to return treason
indictments that had been sought by the crown.
the seventeenth century,

By the end of

the grand jury was firmly established

-.
as an important safeguard of the rights and privileges of
English citizens and was among the institutions brought to this
country by the colonists.
It was against this background that the fifth amendment
to our Constitution was adopted, guaranteeing that "no person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime except on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."
The present federal grand jury retains many of the characteristic features

of its English predecessors.

It operates in secret

as an ex parte accusatory and investigative body free from
the rules of evidence which apply at trial.
The rationale for the latitude accorded to the grand jury
derives from its special and
criminal justice system.

traditional role in the

Although the grand jury determines

whether there is probable cause to hold an accused for trial,
it is not itself the trier of fact.

Because the grand jury's

inquiry is not an adversary proceeding,

the procedural and

evidentiary rules designed to bring about a fair verdict at
trial have been considered largely unnecessary and irrelevant
to the proper discharge of its functions.

Similarly, because

614
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the grand jury's action stands at the initiat).lon and not the
conclusion of the criminal process, restrictions have been
placed upon the litigation of issues involving the conduct
of grand jury proceedings -- such as challenges to the type
or sufficiency of the evidence upon which an indictme.nt was
based.

These restrictions are designed to avoid precipitating

the adj udica tion of iss ues properly reserved for trial on the
merits.
Moreover,

the existence of the grand jury's plenary

investigative powers cannot be separated from the fact that in
general

it alone possesses such powers.

As the Supreme

Court has noted, "the investigation of crime by the grand
jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing
the safety of the person and property of the citizen."ll
Subpoenaing Hitnesses and documentary evidence, taking testimony
under oath, and compelling testimony by providing immunity
against its use in any subsequent proceedings are all basic
steps in uncovering and prosecuting crime,but all, in general,
are available to the government prosecutor in the investigative
stage only

througil the grand jury.

The relationship between the investigative powers and
the procedural role of the Grand Jury has been expressed by
the Supreme Court.

"Uecause [the grand jury's] task is to

inquire in to tIE exis tence

0

f pos s ib Ie crimina I con due t, and to

return only well founded indictments its investigative powers

-

;are necessarily broad."?:../

6 -

I ts powers "mus t be broad if its
~/

lUblic responsibility is adequately to be discharged."

The plurality opinion in the Supreme Court's recent
~cision

in United States v. Mandujano contains a succinct

surrunary of the grand jury's history and current role:!!
The grand jury is an integral part of our
constitutional heritage which was brought
to this country with the common law.
The
Framers, most of them trained in the English
law and traditions, accepted the grand jury
as a basic guarantee of individual liberty;
notwithstanding periodic criticism, much of
which is superficial, overlooking relevant
history, the grand jury continues to function
as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges.
Since the grand jury's broad investigative powers are
fur use in performing its particular functions, and since
secrecy is essential to the proper functioning of the grand
jury, restrictions have been placed upon the disclosure and
use of grand jury materials.

Under the rules and statutes

'which generally govern disclosure of materials in the
~ssession

of the government, defendants can obtain trans-

cripts of the grand jury testimony of prosecution wi tnesses who
~stify

at trial, as well as transcripts of their own

and any exculpatory rna ter ials.

tes~imony,

Apart from these exceptions,

however, grand jury ma ter ials may be disclosed to persons other
than government attorneys and necessary personnel only by court
order upon a showing of some particularized need.

It has

GIG
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been suggested that all grand jury materials shoulJ be made
available to a defendant, or that a witness should be made
available to a defendant, or that a witness should be
entitled to receive a copy of a transcript of his tt'stimony·.
But such a practice migllt be seriously prejudicial to those
witnesses who, sonletimes in fear of physical violence or

.

even threats upon tlleir lives, wish their cooperation to remain secret.

It must be recognized that, if a transcript can

be obtained as a Inatter of right, witnesses could be pressured
into obtaining them so that those being investigated could
see whether they had been implicated in the witness' testimony.
The disclosure of grand jury materials to governlllC'nt
attorneys, authorized by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, is for the purpose of assisting the
government attorney in conducting the grand jury investigation and any litigation related to the grand jury's inquiry.
It is not designed to make grand jury materials available to
other government agencies for use in pursuing investigations
that are solely their own.

At times it is necessary that

grand jury materials be disclosed to government personnel other
than attorneys to obtain assistance in evaluating that material.
Particularly in cases of complex investigations involving
complicated financial transactions and oftentimes massive
documentary evidence, neither the grand jury nor the government
at torney is 1 ~ke 1y to be capa b 1 e (:1£ under s tc1nd ing or in t e rpre ting

GI7
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the evidence without the assistance of other experts.

For

example, in tClX investigations it is sometimes necessary to
obtain the assistance of Internal Revenue agents in order to
assess the tax consequences of particular transactions so ClS
to determine whether an indictment is warranted.

In recognition
of the increasingly frequent need for technical assistallce,
the Supreme Court has recently promulgated an amendment of
Rule 6(e) which provides that grand jury materials mClY be
disclosed, without court order, not only to government attorneys
but also to such other government personnel as are necessary
to assist the attorneys in performing their duties.

In

instances where disclosure of grand jury materials to another
gO'lernment agency is sought for reasons unrelated to the grand
jury I s investiga tion, prior Court approval must be obtained.
Until recent years, the only issues commonly raised
concerning the grClnd jury related to the central question of
whether the institution of the grand jury continued to perform
a suffiCiently useful role in the criminal justice system to
\~arrant

its retention.

Following a century-long debuto,

England abolished tIle grand jury in 1933.

No state has

aboliShed the grand jury, bu t fewer theW hal f presen t ly
require grand jury indictment to initiate criminal chznges.

51B
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One argument which is made against the grand jury
is that it is so much under the thumb of the prosecutor
that it merely follows his wishes.

This overlooks some

historic examples where this has not been the case.

There

is an estimate that in only five percent of the cases
brought before a grand
the prosecutor.

jury will the jury disagree with

But five perce~t is a significant figure.

Moreover, experience indicates that prosecutors in the
fonnation of their own judgments will take into account the
reactions they perceive to exist among the grand jurors.
Another argument against the grand jury as it currently
functions is that individuals when they appear before it
do not have the same protection they would have in a
courtroom or in a police interrogation.

G19
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During the last twenty years, we have seen major developments in the law concerning the due process rights accorded to
suspects and defendants.

Among them, the requirement of so-

called "Niranda warnings," the right to appointment of counsel,
and the exclusionary rule have focused attention on the question
of what is to be considered appropriate governmental conduct in
the investigation and prosecution of crime.
your proposals, Mr.

As is reflected by

Chairman, and the others before this committee,

questions have arisen whether modern concepts of due process require a reassessment of the rights acco~ded to grand jury witnesses.
The first

and perhaps the most important issue

js

wheLher a

witness called oefore the grand jury should oe granted rights to
refuse to respond to its inquiry beyond those accorded by the fifth
amendment privilege -- that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.

be

This question must

viewed in light of the realization that the fifth amendment

privilege itself reflects a balance which has been drawn between
a witness'

need for protection, and society's need for information.

The wi tness sununoned to appear before the grand jury is being formally called upon to perform a long recognized duty of ci-tizenship.
The duty of providing testimony has been regarded as "'so necessary
to the administration of justice' that the witness' personal interest in privacy must yield to the public's overriding interest in

full disclosure."

5/

bi:O
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The fifth amendment privilege is an exception to "the
longstanding principle that the public has a right to every
man's e"vidence," a principle which is "particularly
to grand jury proceedings."

fl../

applicable

On occasion, however, immunity

provisions have for a considerable time filled the need ~f achieving a further balance -- some say implementing the balance -- between the individual's right Il0t to provide information incriminatory of himself

and society's need for his information to pursue

its investigation of the criminal activity of others.

The prac-

tice 6f providing immunity against the use of compelled incriminatory testimony has an unquestioned tradition in English legal
history.

Certain offenses, such as bribery, are of such a character

that the only persons possessing helpful knowledge thereof are
oftentimes those who themselves are implicated in the offense.
If the investigation of crime is not frustrated in such circumstances, there must be a means of both securing the citizen's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and obtaining the
necessary information.
Compelling a witness to testify under a provision of immunity
has been the subject of criticism.

On the one hand, it ~s argued,

that no form of immunity actually places a witness in precisely
the same situation he would be in had he remained silent.

Against

this it is urged that such an argument confuses the interests protected by the fifth amendment privilege with the effect of its
assertion.

The privilege was designed to assure only that a citizen

G21
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is not "forced to give testimony leadirig to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to.

. . 1 acts. '" _7/
.crlmlna

The current fed-

eral cOlTlpulsion statute has also been criticized on the ground
that it affords so-called "use" rather them "transactional"
inununity.

The labels of "use" and "transactional" immunity are

oversimplifications.

The earliest statute, purporting to provide

"use" immunity, protected the witness only against the direct use
of the specific compelled testimony.

It did not prevent the use

of that testimony to uncover other evidence against him.

This

statute was held unconstitutional in 1892 on the ground that it did
not pro tee t the \Vi tness to the same extent as a claim of privilege
would. 8 /

This Supreme Court decision and others that followed

it led to the belief that only a "transactional" irrununity statute,
prohibiting any prosecution for events the witness testified about
under the grant of irrununity, could square with the fifth amendment.

Tlli s vie\V, however, was no t taken by the Supreme Court, and

'the current federal statute has been upheld.

It provides the wit-

ness who is compelled to testify \-lith protection against selfincrimination that is commensurate vlith that of the fifth amendment privilege.

It does so by providing for a total prohibition

on the use of the witness' compelled testimony against hilll in
my fashion, barring not only the use of the compelled testimony
in evidence or as an investigatory lead

but also the use of "any

evidence ob tained by focus ing inves t iga tion on a wi t nes s as a
,result of hi s compe lIed dis closures." Jj

In the even t

0

f any

G22
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subsequent prosecution of an ilmnunized witness, under this fOrI;]
of "use" inlllUnity, the prosecution carries the heavy burden of
proving that the evidence it will use is derived from legitimate
sources wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
t~e

One might wish that our society were so structured that

,

'investigation of crime could rely solely upon the wholly
cooperation of citizens.

volunt~ry

But it is not and has never been.

If

the grand jury is to perform its historic function of investigc:.':ing
crime and returning only well founded indictments, it must have
available to it compulsory process and the testimony of

witness~s

who sometimes are themselves involved in the matters under inquiry.
Increasing the rights of witnesses to refuse to comply with a

g~and

jury inquiry, whatever the merits of the suggestion, would seriously hamper the grand jury in its investigative efforts.

.

An additional question is whether the grand jury witness

should affirmatively be informed of his fifth amendment rights.
An affirmative reminder of a person's rights has been required
in the context of custodial police interrogation, on the rationale
.that the circumstances of such interrogation are so potentially
\

'compulsive as to require that the privilege receive "practical
reinforcement." la/

The question of whether the Constitution

requi.res that "putative defendants" called as grand jury \.Jitnesses
be advised of their fifth amendment privilege or be given full
"Miranda warnings" was recently before the Supreme Court in United
States v. Mandujano. 11/

Although the case was decided on

othe~

grounds, four members of the Court joined in an opinion concluding
that warnings need not be given to a grand jury witness who is

- I 3 -
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called to testify about criminal conduct in which he was personally involved.

TIlis opinion pointed out that the potential

for coercion which led the Court to require warnings in the

COI1-

text of custodial police interrogation is not similarly present
in the setting of a grand jury's inquiry.
Underlying the argument for the imposition of a general
notification requirement is the premise that witnesses would be
less likely to volunteer potentially incriminatory information if
infonned explicitly of their right not to do so.

The question

is, do we wish in the circumstances of a grand jury to adopt a
policy of affirmatively discouraging witnesses from providing evidence?
The question takes on different considerations \vith regard
to testimony by "targets" -- those whose conduct is itself the object of the grand jury's investigation.

Here there are specifica-

tions with respect to "fair play" ~causc
situation.

of the target s special
I

Policy considerations may argue in favor of informing

such a witness that he is considered to be a target, that his
testimony may be used against him, and that he cannot be required
to incriminate himself.

Such warnings are already given in many

districts as a matter of course.

The Supreme Court has recently

agreed to hear two cases involving the question of whether such
warnings are required as a matter of constitutional law.
Closely related to these fifth amendment issues

~s

the ques-

tion whe the r counse 1 should be permi t ted to accompany the wi tne s s

'------------------------ -

~

-

G24

- 11. -

into the grand jury room.

Advocates of such a PJlsition contend

that the presence of counsel is crucial to alerting the witness
to his rights.

Under current federal practice, counsel must re-

main outside the grand jury room, but the witness is free to interrupt his testimony to consult with his attorney as he desires.
Given the witness'

ability to consult with counsel con-

cerning his testimony, barring counsel from the jury room itself
may then seem to bE: at best a meaningless formality and at worst
a device to isolate grand jury witnesses and dissuade them from
asserting their rigllts.
interests.

But the restriction serves two important

In the first place, the grand jury inquiry's continued

ability to function as an informal, non-adversarial proceeding would
be deeply affected by the presence of witnesses' counsel, even if
counsel were restricted solely to the role of advising their clients of their rights.

Permitting counsel to accompany witnesses

into the grand jury room would introduce aspects of the adversarial
process into grand jury proceedings, but without the presence of
the

Judicial figure necessary to prevent adversarial

from becoming bogged down in interminable delay.
Court has emphasized those likely consequences.

proceedini~

The Supreme

525
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An equally important concern relates to violation of
the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding.

Not ~nfrequently,

particularly in investigations of organized crime and of
business frauds and ~ther white collar offenses, one attorney
represents several potential witnesses.

At times, counsel

is retained by the very organization whose activities are
under investigatipn to represent all persons connected with
an organization.

In such situations, the individual witness

may have relevant information and may be willing to cooperate
with the investigation.

But he may understandably not want

his cooperation to be known to the organization which has
retained counsel to represent him.

Under the present system

the witness is able to disclose to counsel as much of his
testimony as he chooses and to secure whatever advice he
deems necessary while retaining the important right to

-conceal

the extent of his cooperation or the fact that he

was required to supply evidence against others.

Were tile

practice changed to admit counsel into the jury room, tile
witness might feel less free to testify; as a practical
mauter, he could not bar his attorney from ~he grand jury
room without his action being given the worst possible
interpretation by those who might wisll that the investiEBtion
be thwarted.
On a more general level one has to ask whether it is wise
to have the grand jury, either as an investigative body or a

- 16 -
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protective screen,take on more and more of the'aspects of a
trial.
It is, of course, impossible to detail all of the issues
which have been raised concerning the scope of the grand
jury's investigative powers and the rights of witnesses.
has been ~uggested

It

that witnesses should be given greater

rights to challenge the reasonableness of subpoenas or the
relevance of requested information;

that the exclusionary rule,

although not constitutionally applicable, should be
legislatively applied to grand jury proceedings; and that
grand jurors should be restricted to acting upon legal and
competent evidence.

All of these proposals are designed to

increase the rights of witnesses and defendants, and to restrict
the possibilities of abuse of the grand jury's investigative
powers.
But, as with questions concerning the role of the fifth
amendment in grand jury proceedings and the presence of witness
counsel in the jury room,

any benefits to witnesses or the

accused must be balanced against the potential effect of the
proposed change upon the proper functioning of the grand
jury itself.
There are two primary disadvantages which one would hope
could be avoided in attempting to revise grand jury procedures:
increas ing the po ten t ial for time- cons uming Ii tiga t ion and de lay
in pretrial proceedings, and decreasing the necessary

- 17 -
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flexibility of the grand jury's investigative_~~thority.

In

considering any proposal for augmenting the rights of grand
jury witnesses and the accused, the central inquiry must be
how the basic goal can best be obtained without unnecessarily
impeding the functioning of the grand jury or burdening the
criminal process with a series of mini-trials unrelated to the
proper determination of guilt or innocence.
The underlying role of the grand jury must also be
remembered.

If we are to keep the grand jury, its e f fee ti venes 5

as an investigative body is extremely

~mportant.

As the SuprerrE

Court has stated: l11
The grand jury may not always serve its
historic role as a protective bulwark standing
solidly between the ordinary citizen and the
over-zealous prosecutor, but if it is even to
approach the proper perfoD11ance of its cons titutional mission, it must be free to pursue
its investigation unhindered by external
influence or supervision, so long as it does
not trench upon the legitimate rights of
any witness called before it.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the grand
jury's powers are not subject to abuse, or that measures
should not be taken to prevent such abuse.

But the broad

investigative powers of the grand jury serve a necessary
function.

I would suggest that ultimately in seeking to

prevent abuse we must look primarily to those authorities
that

are responsible for the proper conduct of grand jury

- 18 -
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proceedings,

that is,

the courts and .the prosecutors.

"Grand

juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to
motions to quash."13!

The courts have traditionally been

sensitive to potential abuses of the rights of citizens, as
is evidenced by the procedural safeguards which have been
promulgated to protect the rights of an accused. Many of these
procedural safeguards have not been held applicable to grand
jury

proceedings.

But the Supreme Court has consistently

reaffirmed that judicial supervision will be exercised over
the conduct of these proceedings.

- 19 -
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We must also of course not overlook~one often-ignored
safeguard against abuses of the grand jury's powers -- the citizens
who themselves comprise the grand jury.

Justice John Harshall

Harlan explained his reluctance to impose judicial restraints upon
legislative inquiry in terms which are particularly appropriate to
the grand jury.

lIe stated:

14/

In the last analysis, it is the independence,
alertness, and connnon sense of our people that:
are the final bulwark of our way of life, whether
it be in protecting civil liberties, economic
freedom and property rights, or in preventing
erosion of our institutions.
For centuries, the grand jury has operated as the voice of
the ci lizenry in the criminal jus tice sys tem.

I t is this which

has accounted for its historic vitality, and it is the "independence, alertness, and conunon sense" of the grand jurors themselves which must ultimately be relied upon to prevent the erosion
of this important institution.
The Department of Justice has a special responsibility with
respect to the grand jury.

Like the traditional role of the grand

jury itself, the responsibility is twofold.

As the prosecutorial

agency of the federal government, the Department needs the effective investigative mechanisms which the grand jury can provide.
But the Department also has the duty to preserve and protect individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Even when it is not compelled to do so by statute or judicial deci sion, th e Departmen t has ins t i tu ted procedures des igned
to protect individual rights in connection with the use of the

- 20 -
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grand jury's power.

For example, while the Supreme Court in
\,1

Branzburg v. Hayes 15/ helu that the First Amenument does not
give newsmen a privilege against revealing information provided
to them in confidence by their sources,

the Department of Justice

has put into effect regulations that set standards for the issuance of subpoenas to newsmen and require the specific authorization
of the Attorney General before such a subpoena may be issued.

The

court in Branzburg explicitly recognized this and stated of an
earlier version of these regulations which was less protective
than the current one that the regulations "may prove wholly
sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies
between the press and federal officials."

16/

Similar Departmental

guidelines in other areas may offer a solution to other legitimate
concerns.
I realize that my testimony today has not solved the problems
we face.

What those problems appear to be depends in many in-

stances upon the special, individual experiences of the person
who is considering the proper functions of the grand jury.

What

I have meant to suggest today is that we must take a more complete

view of the place of the grand jury in our legal system and of the
derivation of the institution's strengths and weaknesses if we
are to achieve reforms that will reinforce the proper and multiple
functions it has served while repairing the flaws we find.
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